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Abstract: The capacity to manage risks and maintain industrial safety is largely based on the capacity 
of various actors to acquire, maintain and share knowledge on a large variety of subjects. The actors 
are, of course, the plant operator but also the employees, the competent authorities, the external 
maintenance teams or internal or external experts in charge of risk assessment and design of risk 
management. The knowledge ranges from the regulatory framework to the details of a machine or a 
process but also includes the general knowledge about the industrial safety, the hazardous phenomena, 
or the properties of the substances. Part of this knowledge is also largely tacit. It lies in the brain of the 
scientific experts or the employees who are able to make the connection between apparently 
disconnected pieces of knowledge. Detecting, extracting, maintaining and communicating this 
knowledge are typical knowledge management activities.  
The authors have been developing for several years knowledge access tools dedicated to the 
communication of generic knowledge on the industrial safety. The structure and content of this system 
is described in the present paper. New developments are now in progress to improve the capacity to 
retrieve and exploit this knowledge as well as to facilitate the management of specific knowledge. 
These developments are based on an ontology of industrial safety.  
The basic principles for developing and using ontologies are recalled. The process for building such an 
ontology in the industrial safety domain is then described as well as its use for indexing and searching 
documents in an industrial safety web platform. Other applications of this ontology are also briefly 
presented. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The issue of  the application of knowledge management to industrial safety is not new. The need for a 
safety related knowledge management strategy was already stressed in 1996 by F. Lees [1] who wrote 
"knowledge of its processes and plants is one of the prime assets of a company, but the management of 
this asset often appears to be relatively neglected". Yet, it seems that the link between knowledge 
management and industrial safety has not been intensively investigated with by researchers in the last 
decade except for the implementation and exploitation of a learning from accidents system. In the 
meantime however, knowledge management has become an issue in many companies. It is therefore 
more than time to study the matter and propose solutions for the companies to manage their safety 
critical knowledge. An more generally, as safety is a collective concern, it is an asset for the entire 
society that the knowledge required to reduce the risk caused by the industry be properly managed. 
After a short introduction about what knowledge management is, this paper presents a system for the 
management of generic knowledge through a web resource plate-form. Then it describes a more 
advanced and complementary approach using an ontology as the main support for the building of a 
safety related knowledge base. The use of this ontology is briefly described. 
 
2.  INTRODUCTION TO KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 
 
Knowledge Management (KM) refers to a range of practices used by organisations to identify, create, 
represent, and distribute knowledge for reuse, awareness and learning across the organisation. This 
very broad definition illustrates the large scope of knowledge management in organisations. In this 
paper, we focus on the need to better manage knowledge in organisations where risks are present and 
try to illustrate by practical applications how knowledge management techniques can be used to 
improve industrial safety.  
 
2.1.  Managing tacit and explicit knowledge 
 
The knowledge can be described and categorized according a variety of classifications. One of the 
most famous was introduced by Nonaka [2] and makes the distinction between explicit knowledge and 
tacit knowledge. Explicit knowledge is the knowledge that is conscious and can be documented. Tacit 
knowledge is the knowledge that resides in the people’s mind in a more or less formalised form, most 
of the time unconsciously. Nonaka identifies the various operations that can be undertaken on 
knowledge :  
- Transforming the tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge is often called formalisation or 
externalisation.  
- Making explicit knowledge accessible to people who may benefit from it is diffusion.  
- Making the explicit knowledge turn into tacit knowledge of actors who will then be able to use it 
is internalisation.  
A complete knowledge management system should be able to perform all these tasks. It should also be 
able to deal with generic and specific knowledge. 
 
2.2.  Managing generic versus specific knowledge 
 
Beside the traditional tacit versus explicit classification of knowledge the distinction between generic 
and specific knowledge is essential. Generic knowledge corresponds to the general concepts. Specific 
corresponds to the instances of these concepts in a given context. Competence is the ability to use 
generic knowledge in a specific context. Many situations illustrate this need to possess generic 
knowledge that will be used to extract and interpret specific information or knowledge. Among them, 
risk analysis is the most emblematic. On the other hand, learning from experience, and especially from 
past accidents obeys to the opposite process. It is specific knowledge that is used to produce generic 
information that will be used in other context to interpret specific data.  
However, there is a large variety of knowledge management system structures and processes 
answering to a large variety of needs. Designing a KM system requires following a series of steps that 
will be described in the next paragraphs. 
 
 
3.  SPECIFYING AND IMPLEMENTING A KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM  
 
3.1.  Specification process 
 
A first approach of the design of a knowledge management system is user-centred. It focuses on the 
future users of the system, their needs and the way they will use the system. The users are not only the 
beneficiary of the formalised knowledge but also the actors owning a tacit or explicit knowledge that 






3.2 Users and other actors involved in the knowledge management process  
 
The users of a safety related Knowledge Management system could be all the actors involved in the 
industrial safety management at the various stages of an industrial plant : design, building, operation, 
maintenance, shutdown, decommissioning. Those actors are, authorities, process experts, risk experts, 
plant designers, plant builders, plant operators, plant workers, plant management staff, contractors. 
Their needs are different but they all interact with common knowledge elements and should be able to 
share common representations, to be aware of risks associated with given substances or equipment and 
to take sound decisions within the organisation. The authors have introduced the concept of Safety 
Critical Knowledge (SCK) to describe the type of knowledge involved in safety management of 
industrial plants [3]. 
 
As far as industrial safety is concerned, various actors have a role to play in the setting of a knowledge 
management system to answer the needs of the industry. Actors with a public mission such as research 
centres, health and safety institutes, universities, but also some consulting companies or industry 
research or service centres, are expected to provide generic knowledge. Plant operators and consulting 
companies use the generic knowledge combined with the plant specific knowledge to manage the risks 
and the associated knowledge. The ideal knowledge management system could therefore be described 
as the combination of a generic knowledge management system operated by actors with a public or 
collective mission and a specific knowledge management system that would be managed for the plant 
operator by himself or sub-contractors. 
 
3.3 Categories of knowledge to be managed 
 
The structure of a very general Knowledge management process dedicated to safety is described in 
figure 1.  The process involves the acquisition or creation of knowledge, its organization in 
appropriate structures or systems and the management of these systems, the diffusion of the 
knowledge to suitable users and their application of knowledge. The systems described in the present 
paper focus on the organization and diffusion phases. Their initial purpose is to organize and make 









































Figure 1 : Structure of a knowledge management process and variety of knowledge concerned by the 
process. 
 
3.4 Risk assessment : a knowledge intensive task 
Risk analysis, and more generally risk assessment, is a knowledge formalisation process in the sense 
that it consists in extracting tacit knowledge from the participants of a risk analysis work group and 
turning it into explicit knowledge. Yet to do so, risk analysis also requires that the participants have 
quite an extensive explicit knowledge both at a specific and generic level. Figure 1 describes the 
various types of knowledge involved in the risk analysis process. Projects such as ARAMIS [4] have 
also produced large amounts of risk analysis specific knowledge. A first issue is how to make this 
necessary knowledge available to the actors. This is partly the goal of a tool like PRIMARISK 
described below. 
As described in figure 1, the risk expert uses a large variety of models and data associated to the 
various steps of risk assessment processes. To make these models, tools and data available to the risk 
assessment community, INERIS is presently developing the resource platform PRIMARISK® [5]. It is 
available on INERIS web site since January 2007. The next paragraphs describe the main features of 
this web platform and present its basic structure in relation with the needs of potential users. 
 
3.6 Definition of the target users 
 
PRIMARISK was designed as a tool to facilitate mutual understanding between the competent 
authorities in charge of the application of the SEVESO directive, the industry, plant operators and 
safety departments and the risk experts, national institutes such as INERIS and consulting companies. 
Each of these users expects to find validated information and tools that will enable him to perform risk 
analysis and risk management tasks, but above all, that will be accepted and recognised by the other 
parties. For this reason, a large part of the knowledge contained in PRIMARISK has been debated 
within national working groups that were set up by the authorities in 2004 and is the result of a 
consensus. 
 
3.7 Content of PRIMARISK 
The first content is the description of the risk assessment process itself. Whereas the objectives and 
principles of industrial major accident risk assessment are relatively well defined by the regulation 
[Arrêté PCIG], the method to achieve these objectives is not fully described.  
INERIS, as technical support to the ministry of environment was in charge of designing a risk 
assessment method, which, even if it's use is not mandatory, constitutes a recognised national 
reference. This method, partly influenced by the results of the ARAMIS project [4], is fully described 
in a report available on INERIS web site [6] and is structured according to the following sequence : 
- Description of the plant; 
- Identification of the hazardous pieces of equipment;  
- Selection of the relevant equipment for analysis; 
- Risk analysis; 
- Identification of the safety barriers; 
- Assessment of the consequences of accidents; 
- Definition of the safety control and requirements for the safety management system. 
 
Each of these steps mobilises a specific knowledge. The description of the process is explicit but the 
understanding of which models, tools and data to use is more of a tacit type. The expertise lies in the 
ability to use the right model for a given hazardous situation. It lies also in the capacity to understand 
the results of the process. In PRIMARISK®, each steps is first described in terms of objectives. The 
relevant legislative texts are given together with other reference text, when they exist. Then the tasks 
are listed. Each of them is described and linked with useful resources and knowledge elements that 
will ease the risk assessment. The format of expected results is described. 
 
The resources can be of three main types : • Local resources : PRIMARISK® lists the elements of information that the person in charge of 
the risk assessment has to obtain from the plant operator such as the maps or process 
instrumentation diagrams. 
• General resources : these are the resources available elsewhere that the user should consult to 
obtain useful information. Most of these resources are available online from INERIS or other 
web sites. Among these are databases, documentation, etc. • Specific resources available directly from PRIMARISK®: These are tools and databases that 
were developed specially for being made accessible through PRIMARISK®. For example, 
PRIMARSIK supports a series of computer models for the online calculation of effect 
distances of hazardous phenomena such as BLEVE, Boil-Over and pool fire. Other models are 
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Figure 2 : general structure of the knowledge resource plate-form PRIMARISK® 
 
Figure 2 shows the general structure of PRIMARISK®. The core system was implemented on a 
MySQL® database and proposes many internal and external links with classical web pages and more 
specific online software. The system also contains a glossary of more than 300 terms, which are put in 
relation with the useful documents, resources and tools.  
PRIMARISK® is updated on a regular basis and constitutes a generic knowledge management and 
capitalization tool both for INERIS scientists and the French industrial risk assessment community. 
 
3.8 From centralised to distributed generic knowledge management systems 
PRIMARISK® is an example of generic knowledge management tool where experts from a single 
institution, here INERIS, can formalise and make their knowledge available in a more elaborated 
format than the usual reports or guides. Its richness lies in the relations established between a variety 
of resources on a base of semantic content of these resources and of their position in a risk assessment 
and management process. In the future, it would be valuable that such a tool be fed with expertise 
from a larger variety of actors from other scientific institutions or administrative or industrial bodies. 
This would increase the capacity of those actors to communicate and understand each other. The same 
is true when considering actors from various countries. Experience has shown that risk assessment and 
management although generally following the same basic principles, were still significantly different 
in the various European countries. Providing a unified European reference resource repository, filled 
by a network of European expertise institutions, would be a useful step towards a more harmonised 
and integrated approach of risk management in Europe. For such a resource to exist it will be 
necessary to propose a common vocabulary and a common way to structure information. This is the 
one of the potential objectives of the development of ontologies described in the second part of this 
paper. 
 
4 DEFINITION OF AN ONTOLOGY OF INDUSTRIAL SAFETY  
 
Ontologies are efficient structures used to formalise the knowledge of a specific domain. An ontology 
contains a set of concepts of the studied domain organised in a hierarchy of classes and sub-classes 
along with other relations between them.  In practical terms, developing an ontology includes defining 
classes of concepts, arranging them into a taxonomic (subclass–superclass) hierarchy, defining 
properties and their facets (constraints). A knowledge base can then be created by defining individual 
instances of these classes, filling in specific property value information and additional property 
restrictions. 
 
Developing ontologies has many advantages mentioned by N. F. Noy and D. L. McGuinnes [7]: • Share a common understanding of the structure of information among people or software 
agents. • Enable reuse of domain knowledge. • Make domain assumptions explicit. • Separate domain knowledge from the operational knowledge. • Analyse domain knowledge. 
 
4.1 Process for building an ontology of industrial safety 
 
As described above, ontologies are powerful tools to formalise and reuse the knowledge of a specific 
domain. This is the reason why the authors have undertaken the development of an ontology of 
industrial safety. The initial purpose of this ontology was to improve the structuring, indexing and 
search of knowledge in PRIMARISK. But its aim is broader. It should eventually constitute a 
reference on which a large variety of actors could base their knowledge management and their 
communication. In fact, an ontology can constitute the main structure of a knowledge base that 
contains much more than traditional databases because of the capacity to create an infinity of relations 
between the concepts and their instances. 
 
To build the ontology of industrial safety, tools were developed to extract terms from the documents 
produced by INERIS scientists. Experts were then asked to organise this knowledge into classes and 
subclasses, and to define the properties of classes and their relations. Building the ontology was 
initiated using the Protégé 3.3 ontology editor and other tools developed specifically [8]. The process 
is described  in figure 3. A first version of the ontology was built and used as a test  the elaboration of 
an information retrieval system. The evolution of this ontology is now continuing as a central 
knowledge formalisation process. 
 
Describing the structure of an ontology is not an easy task. Our aim was first that the ontology be a 
good support for indexing documents in a repository. It should then contain all the concepts of the 
domains described in the resources and documents in the repository. The objective is now to further 
formalize the domain knowledge through the definition of the properties and relations between 
concepts in the ontology. 
 
4.2 Hierarchy of concepts 
The ontology is therefore first a hierarchy of concepts among which are upper level general concepts 
and lower level applied concepts. General concepts are, for example risk, hazard, accident. More 
concrete concepts are, for example equipment, safety devices, documents. For the moment; 
approximately 500 concepts are defined in the ontology. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the 
ontology with a small extract of its present content with terms relevant to the risk analysis of a LPG 
storage. The structure of the ontology reflects the structure of the concepts involved in the risk 
assessment process.  
 
4.3 Defining properties of concepts 
Once the hierarchy of concepts is defined, the ontology allows to define properties to these concepts. 
The most simple type of property is the attribution of a numerical or string value to a slot. Physical 
properties of substances are good examples of such properties. Strings or other types of variables can 












| |_____ Jet Fire
| |______Pool Fire




| |_____ Initiating event
| |_____ Critical event





| |______Liquefied pressurised gas
| | |______Flammable liquefied pressurised gas
| | |______Liquefied pressurised butane






| |______Cylinder pressure vessel









Figure 3 : extract of the ontology of industrial safety showing hierarchy of concepts and relations 
between concepts 
 
4.4 Defining semantic relations in the ontology 
At this stage the structure of the ontology is mostly a hierarchical structure where the terms are related 
to each other by a so called subsumption relation or is_a relation. The next step of developing the 
ontology is to define the other semantic relations between terms. Those will be exploited, for example, 
to navigate in the ontology. They are the expression of the expert knowledge. 
 
For example, the ontology contains the information that propane is a flammable gas. That flammable 
liquefied pressurised gases can produce the hazardous phenomenon BLEVE. This is expressed by a 
relation produces_hazardous_phenomenon between the concepts flammable liquefied pressurised gas 
and BLEVE. Other relations can be defined, such as is_stored_in which is used to described the fact 
that liquefied pressurised gases are stored in pressure vessels. A relation has_safety_device specifies 
the types of safety devices which should be present on a given storage equipment.  
 
Eventually, a complete net of relations can be established which reflects the knowledge on a substance 
or a technology. The user of a system based on the ontology can easily navigate between the concepts 
and access related knowledge. But the system also allows the description of a specific situation by 
creating instances of the concepts. For example, when studying a specific plant, it is possible to create 
an instance of a given equipment to which it is then possible to relate instances of specific safety 
devices categories and instances of initiating events and critical events. By doing so, it becomes 
possible to express the complete results of a risk analysis in the ontology, turning it into a powerful 
tool for the management of the knowledge produced during the analysis. 
 
4.5 Current use of the ontology 
A simple ontology-based information retrieval system was developed to improve the search 
capabilities in PRIMARISK. From a first input of the user, this tool proposes the list of concepts 
containing at least one of the entered words. The user chooses the concept that suits most his query. 
Then, a list of related close terms is proposed. A close term is defined as any term having a direct 
relationship with the initial term. This relation can be an is_a relation but also any other type of 
relation such as the produces_hazardous_phenomenon relation described in figure 3. 
For example, a user entering the keyword "ATEX explosion" will be proposed to refine his query by 
choosing among "gas explosion" and "dust explosion" but also "overpressure effect" and "thermal 
effect". This system allows at the same time for a better formulation of the query by the user and 
offers possibilities of refinement or enrichment of the results. Indeed the user has the choice to limit 
the search to the specific term of the ontology that best describes his search or to enlarge the results to 
all the documents linked to this term by a specific relation (close terms). 
 
4.6 New developments 
New applications of the ontology are now under development. The first one concerns the identification 
of suitable safety devices for a given equipment containing a given hazardous substance in a given 
state. Safety devices are associated to safety functions and to the events potentialy causes of an 
accident scenario. All these concepts were defined in the ARAMIS project. The ontology provides a 
suitable structure to capitalize the extensive inventory work that was done in this project. Additional 
applications are under study to improve the selection of safety devices to ensure its compatibility to 
specific environmental constraints (temperature of use, humidity, presence of dust…).  
 
5 CONCLUSION 
The management of industrial safety requires the use of a large variety of knowledge by many 
different actors. This knowledge needs to be managed both at a generic level for the entire community 
and at a specific level in the industrial plants themself. To answer some of these needs, INERIS has set 
up a knowledge management tool PRIMARISK, which offers a structure to capitalize the knowledge 
produced by INERIS in its public support mission and make it available to a large variety of users. 
The authors have also initiated the development of an ontology of industrial safety which will become 
a basis for knowledge formalisation and capitalization. The ontology is composed of a hierarchy of the 
main concepts involved in industrial safety to which are associated properties and relations in a very 
flexible way. It is presently used to improve the search of information in PRIMARISK but other 
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